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Abstract 
We investigate the Dutch Disease impact of migrant’s remittances and foreign 
aid using a yearly panel data of eight South Asian countries for the period of 
1975-2013. An increase in per capita remittances erodes international competi-
tiveness by appreciating the real effective exchange rate, also leading to a fall in 
traded to non-traded goods production ratio in the economy; hardly any statis-
tically significant impact of foreign aid on these variables is detected. These 
point to premature deindustrialization consequences of large remittance in-
flows that could slow down structural transformation towards manufacturing. 
Although remittances and foreign aid may have a significant impact on poverty 
alleviation in this region, policy planners should pay attention to more effective 
utilization of remittances and foreign aid.  
Keywords 
Dutch Disease, Foreign aid, Real Effective Exchange Rate, Remittances, 
Premature deindustrialization.  
1. Introduction 
 
International transfers of remittances and foreign aid play an important 
role in the total financial inflows into developing countries across the world. 
Although remittances have a positive impact on various socio-economic devel-
opment indicators at both micro and macro level, it also has adverse effects, 
such as the ‘Dutch Disease’. South Asian countries are among the prominent 
recipients of both remittances. The aim of this paper is to examine the Dutch 
Disease impact of international transfers in terms of migrant’s remittances and 
foreign aid, using panel data of eight countries in South Asia for the period of 
1975 to 2013 controlling for country heterogeneity and time fixed effects. 
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International transfers have both positive and negative effects on an econ-
omy. On the positive side are a wide range of effects such as increase in inter-
national reserves, accumulation of human and physical capital, financial devel-
opment and poverty reduction (see Adams and Page 2005, Barajas et al. 2009, 
Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz 2005). Remittances improve macroeconomic stabil-
ity and reduce output volatility as well (Chami, Hakura and Montiel 2009). At 
the micro level, remittances increase household welfare through consumption 
smoothening, and have an important part to play in poverty reduction by rais-
ing the consumption of poor and near-poor households. Remittances also 
work as insurance for migrant sending households against dips in income due 
to natural calamities, crop failure or economic downturns (Yang 2008, Yang 
and Choi 2007). Households those receive remittances may experience a fall in 
fertility (Naufal and Vargas-Silva 2009). Similarly, foreign aid may also bear 
multifaceted benefits in the way of easing balance of payments constraints, fi-
nancing capital goods imports, alleviating poverty; investing in health, educa-
tion and infrastructure; thereby stimulating growth (see Burnside and Dollar 
2000, Fischer 2009, Sachs 2009).  
On the flip side, a large inflow of international transfers such as remittanc-
es and foreign aid can cause real exchange appreciation, resulting in diminished 
external competitiveness, eventually impacting negatively on the traded (manu-
facturing) sector. This phenomenon has been labeled the “Dutch Disease”, 
first coined in 1977 by The Economist magazine to refer the unfavorable ef-
fects of gas revenues, following the discovery of natural gas, on the manufac-
turing sector in the Netherlands‡.  
Globally, in 2014, remittances flows to developing countries increased 
to $436 billion, which was a 4.4 percent higher than in 2013 (World Bank, 
2015).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‡ The Dutch Disease"(November 26, 1977). The Economist, pp.82-83 (as cited in Nsor-
Ambala 2015) 
Source: Migration and Development Brief 24, World Bank, 2015 
Figure 1: External inflows to developing countries 
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Remittances flows to developing countries have become stable, outpacing Of-
ficial Development Assistance (ODA) and private capital flows (Figure 1).  
Mundell (1957) theoretically demonstrated that factor mobility is a sub-
stitute for international trade in bringing about factor price equalization, and by 
implication convergence of wages and prices. In line with this, certain South 
Asian countries seem to export unskilled or semi-skilled manpower abroad, 
especially to the GCC§ countries, earning substantial remittances. According to 
World Bank (2015) statistics, remittances to South Asian countries increased by 
4.5 percent in 2014 compared to a 2.5 increase in 2013. In this region, Pakistan 
saw a sharp rise in remittances (16.6 percent increase), while Bangladesh and 
Sri Lanka experienced 9.6 and 8 percent increases, respectively in 2014. How-
ever, India and Nepal, experienced a fall in remittances.  South Asian countries 
like Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan are in the top ten remittance recipient 
countries in the world. In terms of remittances receipt, in 2014; India, Bangla-
desh and Pakistan were ranked 1st, 7th and 8th, respectively (Figure 1.2). Remit-
tances account for a substantial proportion of GDP in South Asian countries 
as well. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For example, remittances inflows to Nepal accounted for 29 percent of GDP 
in 2013. Remittances also accounted for 6 to 10 percent of GDP in Sri Lanka, 
Bangladesh, Pakistan and India (Figure 3). Moreover, remittances have become 
one of the main sources of international reserves in this region. In Pakistan, 
remittances were 191 percent of international reserves in 2013, which was the 
highest percentage among all other South Asian countries. While remittances 
 
§ Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. 
Figure 2: Top ten remittance recipient in 2014  
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were 86, 83, 77 and 23 percent of international reserves in Sri Lanka, Nepal, 
Bangladesh, and India, respectively (Figure 3).    
 
Figure 4 shows remittances as percent of total exports of goods and services in 
South Asian countries in 2014. In Nepal, remittances were about two and half 
times of exports. In Bangladesh, 
Pakistan and Sri Lanka remittances 
were 42 to 56 percent of exports. In 
India, however, this figure was 
much lower (14 percent) compared 
to other South Asian countries.   
  Migrant’s remittances to this 
region have been growing at a high 
rate. Table 1 presents migrant’s re-
mittances figures for three decades. 
During 1980s on average remittanc-
es as percent of GDP were 2.7 in 
Bangladesh, whereas the figure in-
creased to average 9.9 during 2010s. 
Within three decades this figure goes up by more than three and half times. It 
also increased by more than three times in India within this time period. Re-
mittances data during 1980s for Nepal are not available. During 2000s on aver-
age remittances were 13.2   percent of GDP of Nepal and within a decade this 
figure jumps to average 25.4 percent of GDP. Remittances figures also show 
similar upward trends in Sri Lanka. The only exception is Pakistan. During 
1980s on average remittances were 7.4 percent of GDP, while this figure de-
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Figure 3: Remittances as percent of GDP and international reserves 
in South Asia (2013) 
Source: Migration and Development Brief 24, World Bank, 2015 
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of total exports (2014e)  
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creased to average 5.9 percent of GDP during the first four years of 2010s. Per 
capita remittances increased more than the share of remittances in GDP. Re-
mittances to other three South Asian countries, Afghanistan, Bhutan and Mal-
dives, are not substantial.  
Table 1: Decade average of remittances and foreign aid   
Country 
1980s 2000s 2010s*** 
Remit-
tance(
% of 
GDP) 
Remit-
tance 
(per 
capita)** 
 Aid 
(% of 
GDP) 
Aid*( Per 
capita) 
Remit-
tance(
% of 
GDP) 
Remit-
tance 
(per 
capita) 
Aid 
(% of 
GDP) 
Aid( Per 
capita) 
Remit-
tance(% 
of GDP) 
Remit-
tance 
(per 
capita) 
Aid 
(% of 
GDP) 
Aid( 
Per 
capita) 
Afghanistan  _ _ 0.8 3.219 1.122 4.678 40.3 107.348 1.996 12.999 37.2 229.442 
Bangladesh 2.699 6.082 6.467 14.621 7.241 35.742 2.105 9.344 9.944 84.434 1.445 12.517 
Bhutan _ _ 11.6 50.112 0.290 4.929 10.9 129.583 0.689 16.499 8.3 198.469 
India 1.067 3.247 0.784 2.376 3.092 23.652 0.204 1.393 3.471 51.608 0.139 2.066 
Maldives  1.549 8.611 17.2 82.086 0.282 11.529 3.2 121.122 0.145 9.402 3.3 215.457 
Nepal - - 9.670 16.612 13.182 49.094 6.145 20.269 25.367 176.941 4.404 30.638 
Pakistan 7.395 25.129 2.840 9.802 3.808 28.187 1.642 11.167 5.937 71.158 1.295 15.129 
Sri Lanka 5.117 18.601 8.480 30.572 7.625 99.268 2.477 31.166 9.172 263.826 0.912 25.458 
Notes: *Aid consists of Net Official Development Assistance (ODA) plus official foreign aid. ** Both remittances per 
capita and aid per capita are in US $. *** Up to 2013. 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on World Development Indicators (WDI) 2014, World Bank. 
 
Foreign aid flows, however, to South Asia are not as significant as remittances. 
Only Afghanistan receives a substantial amount of foreign aid. In the 2000s 
and 2010s, on average, foreign aid to Afghanistan were 40.3 and 37.2 per cent 
of GDP, respectively. Bhutan also received aid amounting to about 10 percent 
of its GDP during the study period. Table 1 reveals that the GDP share of for-
eign aid was higher than remittances in the 1980s, and then foreign aid’s im-
portance gradually diminished. Each year a great number of people from South 
Asian countries migrate abroad for better employment opportunities. In Bang-
ladesh from 1976 to 2015, a total of about 9.5 million (about 5.93 percent of 
total population) workers have migrated to all over the world for employ-
ment**. There are five million Indian workers across the globe††. The Indian 
diaspora constitutes 25 million people in some 110 countries, which is the sec-
ond largest diaspora in the world (Afram, 2012). In Nepal, a total of about 2 
million people (about 7.3% of total population) were reported missing in 2011 
 
** Bureau of Manpower, Employment and Training (BMET), Ministry of Expatriates’ 
Welfare and Overseas Employment, Bangladesh.      
†† Annual Report, 2014-15, Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, India 
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census. They are believed to be working abroad‡‡. Up to December 2013, a 
total of 7.8 million Pakistanis (about 4.17 % of the population) were liv-
ing/working/studying all over the world§§. An estimated 1.7 million (almost 
25% of total population) Sri Lankans were employed abroad in 2013***. As a 
whole, a total of 70 million people of South Asian origin live around the world 
(Burki 2013, as cited in Rahman 2014:3). In addition to this, each year a good 
number of workers migrate to other countries through illegal channels.  
This study emphasizes the premature deindustrialization perspective in 
South Asian countries as a consequence of Dutch Disease effects of migrant 
remittances and foreign aid. Earlier studies put little or no emphasis on the re-
source movement effect. Thus, this paper will contribute to the literature of 
the Dutch Disease effects in South Asian countries resulting from international 
transfers.  Section 2 outlines the theoretical approach and existing empirical 
literature, section 3 presents the methodology and data, section 4 contains our 
results, followed by conclusions in section 5.  
2. Theoretical Approach and Empirical Evi-
dence   
       
The issue of international transfers was debated between John Maynard 
Keynes and Bertil Ohlin in 1929 in connection with German reparation pay-
ments following the First World War. According to Keynes, the reparation 
payments were a burden to Germany; the transfer would require price and cost 
reductions in the export sector, which in turn would cause a deterioration in 
terms of trade. Ohlin, however, argued that because of income effects on the 
recipients of transfers, the terms of trade in the donor country would be un-
changed (Brakman and Marrewijk 1998: 22). Leontief (1936) argued that the 
donor would gain from an international transfer. Samuelson (1947), however, 
pointed out that in a two-good, two-country, distortion-free Walrasian compet-
itive equilibrium, the welfare of the recipient would increase at the expense of 
the donor.  
Salter (1959) and Swan’s (1960) seminal work showed a rise in domes-
tic spending due to the transfer, and an appreciation of the real exchange rate 
due to the balance of payments surplus in a small open economy. Also, be-
cause of the spending effect, the demand for non-tradables increases along 
 
‡‡ Labour Migration for Employment: A Status Report for Nepal, 2013/14, Ministry 
of       Labour and Employment, Nepal.    
§§ Final year book 2013-14, Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis and Human Resource De-
velopment, Pakistan.   
*** Ministry of Foreign Employment, Sri Lanka.  
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with its relative price. Consequently, there is a resource re-allocation with pro-
ductive resources moving to the non-traded sector from the traded sector. This 
is the essence of what was later termed the Dutch Disease. Corden and Neary 
(1982) discuss the similar, Dutch Disease, impact of natural resource revenue 
gains. International transfer like remittances and foreign aid also act like in-
flows of natural resource revenue. The two effects, spending and resource real-
location to the non-traded sector, can shrink the traded (agricultural or manu-
facturing sectors).   
Krugman (1987) explains that inflows of international transfers like 
natural resource revenue appreciates real exchange rate and some of the traded 
sector lose competitiveness and move abroad. If the transfer does not last 
long, external competitiveness is regained, but long lasting and substantial  
transfers erodes international competitiveness in some tradable sectors perma-
nently. In that case, both merchandise export market share and international 
competitiveness decline. Thus, temporary resource booms cause a permanent 
loss of competitiveness. For developing countries, this means that their future 
potential for exporting manufactured goods and diversifying the production 
base is stunted. If there are positive externalities from human-capital accumula-
tion in manufacturing only, as in Matsuyama (1992), and transfers retard the 
development of the more dynamic manufacturing sector, the growth path of 
the economy under free trade is lower than that of other countries.   
Lopez, Monila and Bussolo (2008) explain that international transfers 
especially remittances can appreciate the real exchange rate firstly, by increasing 
the net foreign asset position of the remittance receiving country in relation to 
rest of the world. Secondly, changes in sectoral productivity can also take place. 
Remittances induce demand for non-tradables, redirecting labour there from 
the traded sector, thereby increasing relative real wages in the tradable sector. 
This differential leads to real exchange rate appreciation (Ballasa-Samuelson 
effect).  
Acosta et al. (2009) find Dutch Disease impacts of remittances in El 
Salvador. Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2004) find Dutch Disease symptoms 
caused by remittances, appreciating the real exchange rate in 13 Latin Ameri-
can and Caribbean countries. Lartey et al. (2012) find remittances induced 
Dutch Disease in a panel of 109 developing countries that operate more 
strongly under fixed exchange rates. Bourdet  and  Falck (2007) find less strong 
adverse effect of remittances on the competitiveness of tradables. In South 
Asian countries, Dutch Disease symptoms have also been evident. Chowdhury 
and Rabbi (2013) show that workers’ remittances cause real exchange rate ap-
preciation in Bangladesh, which in turn causes loss of competitiveness in ex-
port markets. Mughal and Makhlouf (2013) find Dutch Disease effects of re-
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mittances in the economy of Pakistan. On the other hand, Ratha (2013) does 
not find any Dutch Disease symptoms in India.     
By contrast, Nyoni (1998) finds that foreign aid depreciates the real ex-
change in Tanzania. Martins (2013) does not find any Dutch Disease phenom-
enon in the Ethiopian economy. Barajas et al. (2011) explain that the impact of 
remittances on equilibrium real exchange rate comes through variety of macro-
economic channels. It depends on the remittance-receiving country’s charac-
teristics, pattern of remittance inflows (cyclical or not), long-run investment 
position induced by remittance inflows, and utilization of remittances (whether 
spent on non-traded or traded goods). The authors find mixed evidence of re-
mittances on equilibrium real exchange rate in both single-country and a panel 
setting.  
Foreign aid was thought to bridge the gap between demand and supply 
of capital in developing countries. However, to reap the benefits of aid pres-
ence of some good policies is very much important. Burnside and Dollar 
(2000) find that foreign aid is effective in accelerating growth of GDP in de-
veloping countries with good fiscal, monetary and trade policies. If aid is not 
channeled into investment rather than consumption, it causes a rise in the rela-
tive price of non-tradables, thereby appreciating real exchange rate. Rajan and 
Subramanian (2006), with a cross country panel data analysis, show that one 
percentage point increase in the ratio of aid-to-GDP is associated with 0.2-0.3 
percentage point reduction in the share of manufacturing sector to total GDP. 
Prati and Tressel (2006) find similar negative effects of aid on overall export 
sector. Empirical evidence of aid induced Dutch Disease is thus mixed. Coun-
tries where aid is used as investment and aid raises productivity in non-
tradables there is no Dutch Disease effect, whereas countries where aid induc-
es consumption of more non-tradable goods and services there is a Dutch Dis-
ease effect. Effects of international transfers on growth of manufacturing sec-
tor also found mixed. Rajan and Subramanian (2011) find a negative impact of 
foreign aid on the growth rate of manufacturing sector in 47 developing coun-
tries whereas, Dzansi (2013) finds positive effects of remittances on the growth 
of manufacturing sector in a number of remittance dependent economies.  
 3. Methodology and Data  
This study attempts to examine the relationship between external in-
flows (remittances and foreign aid) and the real exchange rate (REER), as well 
as changes in the relative composition of output between traded and non-
traded goods. Consequently, we run two separate regressions: one for the 
Spending Effect, the other capturing the Resource Reallocation Effect.  
Spending effect equation: 
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REERit = β0 + β1 REMit + β2 ODAit + β3 FDIit + β4 OPENit + β5 TOTit + β6 
GOVEXit + β7 GDPPC+ β8 M2+ γt+vi+ eit --------------(1) 
 
Resource reallocation equation: 
 
TNTit = β0 + β1 REMit + β2 ODAit + β3 FDIit + β4 OPENit + β5 TOTit + β6 
GOVEXit + β7 GDPPC+ β8 M2+ δt+λi + μit --------------(2) 
            i= 1, 2…., N   t=1, 2….., T 
Where, 
REER= Real Effective Exchange Rate   
REM= Migrant’s Remittances (percent of GDP/ per capita) 
ODA= Net Official Development Assistance and official aid received (percent 
of GDP/ per capita) 
FDI= Net Foreign Direct Investment (percent of GDP) 
OPEN= Trade Openness (sum of exports and imports as percent of GDP) 
TOT= Net Barter Terms of Trade  
GOVEX= General government final consumption expenditure (percent of 
GDP) 
GDPPC= GDP per capita (current US $) 
M2= Money and quasi money (percent of GDP) 
γt   and δt = Time fixed effect  
vi  and λi = Time invariant country fixed effect  
eit  and μit = error terms  
Details on the data sources and definitions are given in the appendix. 
From the theoretical perspective (Corden and Neary 1982, Krugman 1987) it is 
evident that inflows of remittances may act like inflows of natural resource 
revenues, which may appreciate the real exchange rate. Therefore, a positive 
sign for remittances (REM) in equation (1) is expected. In order to control for 
non-linearties in this mechanism we will also incorporate the square of the re-
mittance to GDP ratio. Foreign Aid/ODA is an international transfer like re-
mittances. Thus, a positive sign for Aid/ODA is expected in equation (1) as 
well. Similarly, large FDI inflows appreciate REER.     
    According to the Balassa-Samuelson Hypothesis (see Balassa 1964 and 
Samuelson 1964), differences in productivity may have implications for the 
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REER appreciation. To capture this effect we have employed GDP per capita 
for each country as a proxy for productivity differentials (see Amuedo-
Dorantes and Pozo 2004). We expect that countries with higher GDP per capi-
ta (GDPPC) to experience REER appreciation. Therefore a positive sign is 
expected in equation (1) for this variable.  
Government expenditure can change the relative price of non-tradables 
which can influence REER in turn. If the expenditures fall disproportionately 
on the non-traded sector, then prices of non-tradables will increase which will 
appreciate the REER (Froot and Rogoff 1995, as cited in Amuedo-Dorantes 
and Pozo 2004). But if it falls disproportionately on the traded sector, then it 
will depreciate the REER (Montiel 1999:279, as cited in Amuedo-Dorantes and 
Pozo 2004).  
External terms of trade (TOT) may influence the REER. If relative 
wages in tradables increase without a rise in labour productivity, it will appreci-
ate REER. Therefore, we expect positive sign for TOT in equation (1).  
Trade openness (OPEN) has been included to capture the effect of 
trade restrictions on REER determination. An increase in import tariff reduces 
income, which in turn reduces demand for all goods and services. A fall in de-
mand for non-tradables will reduce prices and, thereby depreciating REER 
(Lartey et al. 2012).On the other hand, the substitution effect induces a switch 
to non-tradables from imported goods after an increase in import tariff, caus-
ing prices of non-tradables to rise leading to REER appreciation (Edwards 
1989, as cited in Lartey et al. 2012).Therefore, in equation (1) either a negative 
or positive association is expected. Broad money (M2) may cause real exchange 
rate appreciation through increased money supply and the associated inflation. 
A positive sign is expected for M2 in the equation (1).   
The variables which are expected to have positive signs in equation (1) 
are likely to have negative signs in equation (2). This is because a real exchange 
rate appreciation will cause the traded to non-traded ratio to diminish.    
4. Estimation and Analysis  
 
We consider annual panel data from Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Paki-
stan, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Maldives and Afghanistan spanning the period from 
1975 to 2013. Data for all variables are not available for all these 38 years and 
for all countries leading to an unbalanced panel. 
We estimated pooled OLS, and also fixed effect models to control for 
time invariant country fixed effects and time fixed effects.  After performing 
the Hausman test we found that fixed effect model is preferred to the random 
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effect model. One of our main variables of interest, remittances, may pose en-
dogeneity issues. To rectify this problem, we adopt an Instrumental Variable 
(IV) approach to find the true impact of remittances on REER.       
 
Pooled OLS Estimation of REER  
    Firstly, we have pooled all yearly data for 8 countries over different 
years spanning from the period of 1975-2013. We have considered both Dris-
coll-Kraay (DK) and Cluster-Robust (CR) standard errors. In the case of mac-
ro panel (long time dimensions and short cross-sections) DK based estimates 
are more efficient than the CR based estimates, as ‘DK standard errors are het-
eroskedasticity consistent and robust to general forms of cross-sectional (spa-
tial) and temporal dependence when the time dimension becomes large’ 
(Hoechle 2007: 286).  
Our data set is an unbalanced macro panel consisting of only 8 coun-
tries (cross sections) and on average a time period of 30 years. The data suffer 
from the presence of heteroskedasticy, cross sectional dependency (error terms 
of cross sections are dependent) and autocorrelation. In that case cluster-
robust standard errors will give inefficient estimates, whereas Driscoll-Kraay 
standard error will give more efficiency. In table 2 we see that under DK and 
CR standard errors estimations values of coefficients are all the same but val-
ues of standard errors are slightly higher in DK estimation.   
Table 2 reports regression results of the relation between real effective 
exchange rate and our main variables of interest (remittances and foreign aid). 
In all specifications both remittances as percent of GDP and remittances as 
per capita have the expected positive sign and are statistically highly significant. 
This indicates that remittances appreciate REER. If we were to drop Bhutan, 
Maldives and Afghanistan from the sample, the coefficient becomes smaller 
(0.027). The squared term on the remittances to GDP ratio is negative and 
highly significant, indicating a non-linearity in this process. This means that 
after a threshold, which we identify to be 14.64 % of GDP remittances begin 
to depreciate the REER. This may be because of some initial REER over-
appreciation. Alternatively, the non-linearity may indicate that other factors 
become more salient, such as a substantial merchandise export decline causing 
balance of payments problems, eventually driving these economies to regain 
international competitiveness via depreciating real exchange rates. Foreign aid 
(ODA), in both measures (percent of GDP and per capita), has a negative sign 
and is statistically highly significant, indicating that aid depreciates REER.  
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Table 2: Pooled OLS estimates of REER, with Driscoll-Kraay and cluster-robust Stand-
ard Errors 
 
Dependent variable : Log of Real Effective Exchange Rate(REER) 
 With Driscoll-Kraay  Standard Error With Cluster-Robust  Standard Error 
Regressors  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Remittances (% of GDP) 0.205***   0.205***  0.205*** 
 (0.029)   (0.027)  (0.029) 
Remittances (% of GDP) squared  -0.007***   -0.007***  -0.007*** 
 (0.001)   (0.001)   
Log Remittances (per capita)  0.495*** 0.522***  0.495*** 0.522*** 
  (0.059) (0.045)  (0.041) (0.036) 
ODA ( Net ODA+ Official aid % of GDP)  -0.052*** -0.056***  -0.052*** -0.056***  
 (0.003) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.003)  
Log ODA (Net ODA+ Official aid per capita)   -0.344***   -0.344*** 
   (0.062)   (0.048) 
Foreign Direct Investment  (% of GDP) -0.030 0.022 0.011 -0.030 0.022 0.011 
 (0.061) (0.042) (0.037) (0.079) (0.055) (0.044) 
Log terms of trade (TOT) 0.129 0.240 -0.055 0.129 0.240** -0.055 
 (0.263) (0.265) (0.066) (0.129) (0.118) (0.113) 
Log trade openness( X+M as % of GDP)  -0.516*** -0.502*** -0.256** -0.516*** -0.502*** -0.256*** 
 (0.181) (0.126) (0.099) (0.107) (0.082) (0.096) 
Government Expenditure ( % of GDP) -0.011 0.005 0.005 -0.011 0.005 -0.011 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) 
M2 (% of GDP) -0.003 -0.009*** -0.016*** -0.003 -0.009*** -0.016*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Log per capita GDP -0.296* -0.731*** -0.548*** -0.296*** -0.731*** -0.548*** 
 (0.161) (0.113) (0.088) (0.102) (0.085) (0.075) 
Constant 7.404*** 8.922*** 9.078*** 7.404*** 8.922*** 9.078*** 
 (1.741) (1.573) (0.792) (0.931) (0.808) (0.653) 
       
Observations 167 167 167 167 167 167 
R-squared 0.841 0.901 0.851 0.841 0.901 0.851 
Number of countries 8 8 8 8 8 8 
Notes: In column 1-3 Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are in the parenthesis. In column 4-6 Cluster-Robust standard errors are in 
the parenthesis. Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity, cross sectional dependence and autocorrelation.  
Asterisk ***,**,* indicates significance at  1 ,5 and 10% level, respectively. 
 
However, the pooled OLS estimates may be biased and inconsistent as 
we have not controlled for the country and time fixed effects. Time-invariant 
unobservable country characteristics might be correlated with the explanatory 
variables. Country fixed characteristics and time variable may also be important 
determinants of REER. In addition, remittances are not purely exogenous.  In 
the next section, we will perform instrumental variable fixed effect estimates 
addressing endogeneity and controlling for time-invariant country effects and 
time fixed effect.  
Instrumental Variable (IV) Fixed Effect Estimation of REER 
There may be a reverse causality between remittances and REER. On 
the one hand, REER depends on remittance inflows; on the other hand, remit-
tance inflows may depend on the level of REER. Remittances could also be 
procyclical and counter cyclical. If remittances are sent as capital for invest-
ment motives, in the good time of the remittances receiving economy there 
will be more remittance inflows (procyclical), and vice versa. On the other 
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hand, if remittances are sent for altruistic reasons, remittance inflows increase 
during economic downturns (countercyclical). Therefore, in literature it is ar-
gued that remittances are endogenous (see Acosta et al. 2009, Amuedo-
Dorantes and Pozo 2004, Lartey et al. 2012).  
To remove the problem of potential endogeneity one can opt for in-
strumental variable and system GMM techniques. But in our case system 
GMM will not be efficient since the data set is a macro panel, large T and small 
N (Roodman 2009). That is why we adopt the IV technique only. In literature 
various instruments for remittances have been proposed, such as school en-
rollment rate, crop and livestock production index, immunization index, litera-
cy rate, economic condition of host countries, distance between migrant send-
ing and receiving countries, stock and flow of migrants, population density, 
unemployment rate in sending country etc. We have performed IV fixed effect 
regression using crop production index and primary school enrollment rate as 
instruments, following Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2004). Hausman tests 
suggest that the random effects model is a less efficient estimator. It is ex-
pected that volume of remittances will be higher with a low value of crop pro-
duction and low level of primary school enrollment, and vice versa. Most of 
the remittances earners in South Asian countries are unskilled or semiskilled 
workers, and they have low levels of schooling or no schooling at all. Surplus 
labour in agriculture, compels surplus workers to look for jobs elsewhere, put-
ting pressure on labour markets in informal sectors. Thus, a low level of agri-
cultural production and school enrollment will increase out migration, thereby 
increasing the volume of remittances.  
We find negative signs for both crop production index and school en-
rollment ratio in the first stage IV regression for remittances. Coefficients of 
instruments are statistically significant at conventional levels. Both of the in-
struments passed the test of under identification. Kleibergen-Paap rk LM sta-
tistics is statistically significant, which rejects the null of under identification. 
However, the crop production index does not pass the weak instrument test, 
whereas the primary school enrollment ratio is a strong instrument if 3 coun-
tries: Afghanistan, Bhutan and Maldives are excluded; the previously reliable 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic diminishes substantially with their inclu-
sion. Results of first stage IV fixed effect regression are presented in table 3, 
and results of second stage IV fixed effect estimation are presented in table 4.  
Due to the lack of an instrument for the square of remittances/GDP, we do 
not experiment with a squared term in table 4.  
 
(Continued on next page) 
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 Table 3: First stage IV Fixed Effect estimates of REER  
 
Dependent variable is Log remittances per capita 
Regressors IV-1 IV-2 
   
Log crop production index  -1.019*  
 0.547  
Log primary school enrollment ratio  -1.344** 
  (0.591) 
Log ODA (Net ODA+ Official aid per capita) 0.059 0.074 
 (0.170) (0.220) 
Foreign Direct Investment  (% of GDP)       -0.082*** -0.079 
 (0.173) (0.052) 
Log terms of trade (TOT) -0.150 -0.342 
 (0.165) (0.310) 
Log trade openness  0.382 0.279 
 (0.262) (0.351) 
Government Expenditure ( % of GDP) 0.031 0.040 
 (0.025) (0.051) 
M2 (% of GDP) 0.028*** 0.033*** 
 (0.010) (0.010)  
Log per capita GDP  0.749 0.596 
 (0.386) (0.617) 
Observations  167 137 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic   (P value )  0.046 0.0379 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic 3.48 5.18 
Notes: Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are in parenthesis. Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are 
robust to heteroskedasticity, cross sectional dependence and autocorrelation.  Asterisk ***,**,* 
indicates significance at  1 ,5 and 10% level, respectively. Regressions contain time-fixed ef-
fects. IV-1= Log crop production index, IV-2= Primary school enrollment ratio.  
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Like with the pooled OLS remittances also appear with a positive sign 
in the IV fixed effect estimation. Remittances are statistically significant at 1 
percent level. Foreign aid (ODA) has the same negative sign as in pooled OLS, 
but here it is not statistically significant at any conventional level. Therefore, 
foreign aid (ODA) does not have any effect on the REER determination. Co-
efficients of remittances differ under the two instruments. With the crop pro-
duction index the coefficient is larger than with the primary school enrollment, 
the latter being more acceptable.    
One may question the validity of REER appreciation if the countries 
follow fixed exchange or managed exchange rate regimes. Under fixed ex-
change rate regime, there will be little direct impact of remittances and foreign 
aid on nominal exchange rates but will lead to reserve accumulation. Most 
South Asian countries pursue fixed or managed exchange rates. Bangladesh, 
Table 4: Second stage IV Fixed-Effects estimates of REER 
 
Dependent variable is Log of Real Effective Exchange Rate(REER) 
Regressors IV-1 IV-2 
   
Log Remittances (per capita) 0.457* 0.191* 
 (0.263) (0.110) 
Log ODA (Net ODA+ Official aid per capita) 0.010 0.085 
 (0.067) (0.071) 
Foreign Direct Investment  (% of GDP) 0.041 0.003 
 (0.043) (0.040) 
Log terms of trade (TOT) -0.115 -0.231*** 
 (0.104) (0.069) 
Log trade openness  -0.264 -0.070 
 (0.175) (0.129) 
Government Expenditure ( % of GDP) -0.005 0.002 
 (0.014) (0.012) 
M2 (% of GDP) -0.004 0.001 
 (0.007) (0.005) 
Log per capita GDP  0.410 0.788*** 
 (0.320) (0.168) 
   
Observations 167 137 
R-squared 0.512 0.716 
Number of countries 8 8 
Country fixed effect Yes Yes 
Time fixed effect  Yes  Yes 
Notes: Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are in parenthesis. Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are 
robust to heteroskedasticity, cross sectional dependence and autocorrelation.  Asterisk ***,**,* 
indicates significance at  1 ,5 and 10% level, respectively.  
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Pakistan and Sri Lanka have effectively fixed exchange rate regimes, while In-
dia has a managed floating exchange rate regime (Cavoli and Rajan 2013).    
REER determination depends not only on nominal exchange rate but 
also on price levels. With a fixed exchange rate regime an exogenous increase 
in international transfers increases general price levels, thus appreciating 
REER. However, with flexible exchange rate regime, real appreciation happens 
quickly through nominal exchange rate appreciation. Under a fixed exchange 
rate regime real appreciation takes place in the longer run, but the outcome 
could be greater. Lartey et al. (2012) investigate Dutch Disease impact of for-
eign remittances in countries under both fixed and flexible exchange rate re-
gimes. They find stronger Dutch Disease impact in countries under fixed nom-
inal exchange rate regimes. Similarly, Fielding and Gibson (2012) find a 
stronger Dutch Disease impact of foreign aid on countries under fixed ex-
change rate regimes.  
Pooled OLS Estimation of Traded to Non-Traded Sector Ra-
tio (TNT) 
Results of pooled OLS regressions of TNT for different specifications 
are presented in table 5. Remittances to GDP, has the expected negative sign 
and is statistically significant at 10% level of significance. The coefficient on of 
the squared term for remittances is very small (0.001), and is significant at the 
10% level. Coefficients on foreign aid as percent of GDP and as per capita, 
have unexpectedly positive signs. However, remittances as per capita is only is 
significant at a 5% level.     
 
 
 
 
 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 5: Pooled OLS estimates of Traded to Non-Traded ratio (TNT) 
 
Dependent variable is Traded to Non-Traded ratio (TNT) 
Regressors (1) (2) (3) 
    
Remittances (% of GDP) -0.018*   
 (0.010)   
Remittances (% of GDP) squared  0.001*   
 (0.000)   
Log Remittances (per capita)  -0.018 -0.017 
  (0.021) (0.022) 
ODA ( Net ODA+ Official aid % of GDP)  0.001 0.001  
 (0.002) (0.002)  
Log ODA (Net ODA+ Official aid per capita)   0.028** 
   (0.011) 
Foreign Direct Investment  (% of GDP) -0.025 -0.025 -0.021 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) 
Log terms of trade (TOT) -0.022 -0.021 -0.013 
 (0.047) (0.050) (0.059) 
Log trade openness( X+M as % of GDP)  -0.012 -0.026 -0.067* 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.035) 
Government Expenditure ( % of GDP) 0.011** 0.012** 0.012** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
M2 ( % GDP) 0.000 0.001 0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log GDP per capita -0.275*** -0.261*** -0.270*** 
 (0.055) (0.051) (0.056) 
Constant 2.641*** 2.562*** 2.631*** 
 (0.419) (0.398) (0.425) 
    
Observations 167      167       167 
R-squared 0.710 0.702 0.710 
Number of countries        8        8 8 
Notes: Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are in parenthesis. Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are 
robust to heteroskedasticity, cross sectional dependence and autocorrelation.  Asterisk ***, 
**, * indicates significance at 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
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Country fixed effects and time variables may have significant effects on 
the TNT ratio.    
Fixed-Effect Estimation of Traded to Non-Traded Sector Ra-
tio (TNT) 
Results of fixed effect estimates of TNT for different specifications are 
presented in table 6.  
Table 6: Fixed-Effect estimates of Traded to Non-Traded ratio (TNT)  
 
Dependent variable is Traded to Non-Traded ratio (TNT) 
Regressors  (1) (2) (3) 
    
Remittances (% of GDP) -0.016**   
 (0.006)   
Remittances (% of GDP) squared  0.000   
 (0.000)   
Log Remittances (per capita)  -0.082* -0.086* 
  (0.038) (0.038) 
ODA ( Net ODA+ Official aid % of 
GDP)  
0.010* 0.008  
 (0.004) (0.006)  
Log ODA (Net ODA+ Official aid per 
capita) 
  0.050* 
   (0.024) 
Foreign Direct Investment  (% of GDP) 0.001 0.002 0.001 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.010) 
Log terms of trade (TOT) -0.090** -0.013 -0.005 
 (0.027) (0.018) (0.019) 
Log trade openness( X+M as % of GDP)  -0.052 0.005 0.042 
 (0.031) (0.029) (0.036) 
Government Expenditure ( % of GDP) -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) 
M2 ( % GDP) -0.001 -0.003* -0.003* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log GDP per capita 0.007   
 (0.171)   
GDP Growth  0.003 0.003 
  (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant 1.711** 1.594*** 1.498*** 
 (0.535) (0.221) (0.173) 
    
Observations 167 165 165 
R squared (within) 0.853 0.854 0.854 
Number of countries 8 8 8 
Country fixed effect Yes  Yes Yes 
Time fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are in parenthesis. D-K standard errors are 
robust to heteroskedasticity, cross sectional dependence and autocorrelation.  Aster-
isk ***,**,* indicates significance at  1 ,5 and 10% level, respectively.  
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Like with pooled OLS, remittances appear statistically significant with a 
negative sign, and foreign aid (ODA) has a positive sign. The squared term for 
remittances is zero and insignificant. These findings reflect that remittances 
affect the composition of traded and non-traded sector, and foreign aid does 
not have any negative impact. Time fixed effects and country fixed characteris-
tics might have a bearing on these results, making aid statistically insignificant 
in the fixed effect model. Table 7 presents summary findings related to two 
dependent variables using two different models.  
Table 7: Estimates of REER and TNT, Pooled OLS and Fixed Effect models  
 
Dependent variable is log of Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) and TNT  
               REER               TNT 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Regressors Pooled  
OLS 
IV-2 FE  Pooled 
OLS 
FE 
     
Remittances (% of GDP) 0.205***  -0.018* -0.016** 
 (0.029)  (0.010) (0.006) 
Remittances (% of GDP) squared -0.007***  0.001* 0.000 
 (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Log Remittances (per capita)  0.191*   
  (0.110)   
ODA ( Net ODA+ Official aid % 
of GDP) 
-0.052***  0.001 0.010* 
 (0.003)  (0.002) (0.004) 
Log ODA (per capita)  0.085   
  (0.071)   
Foreign Direct Investment  (% of 
GDP) 
-0.030 0.003 -0.025 0.001 
 (0.061) (0.040) (0.020) (0.006) 
Log terms of trade (TOT) 0.129 -0.231*** -0.022 -0.090** 
 (0.263) (0.069) (0.047) (0.027) 
Log trade openness  -0.516*** -0.070 -0.012 -0.052 
 (0.181) (0.129) (0.027) (0.031) 
Government Expenditure ( % of 
GDP) 
-0.011 0.002 0.011** -0.002 
 (0.008) (0.012) (0.005) (0.006) 
M2 (% of GDP) -0.003 0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log per capita GDP -0.296* 0.788*** -0.275*** 0.007 
 (0.161) (0.168) (0.055) (0.171) 
     
Observations 167 137 167 167 
R-squared ( within) 0.841 0.716 0.710 0.853 
Number of countries  8 8 8 8 
Country fixed effect - Yes - Yes 
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Based on the IV-2 fixed effect estimates (column 2) if per capita remittances 
increase by one percent, controlling for other factors, then on an average 
REER appreciates by 0.191 percent. Alternatively, if per capita remittances 
double, REER appreciates by 19.1 percent which is similar to Amuedo-
Dorantes and Pozo’s (2004) findings. They found that a doubling of per capita 
remittances raises real exchange rate by 23 percent in 13 Latin American coun-
tries. On the other hand, remittances (as percent of GDP) are negatively asso-
ciated with the traded to non-traded sector ratio (TNT) and statistically signifi-
cant at conventional levels in both pooled OLS and Fixed Effect models. 
Fixed effect estimates of TNT (column 4) show that a one percentage point 
increase in remittances to GDP leads to fall in traded to non-traded ratio by 
0.016.   Both the magnitudes of spending and resource movement effects are 
substantial and economically significant. These findings indicate the loss of in-
ternational competitiveness, thereby reducing export volume, and contraction 
of the traded manufacturing sector. Over the period per capita remittances in 
South Asian countries increased manifold (in Bangladesh 13 times) and the 
service sector which is primarily non-tradable expanded substantially (in Bang-
ladesh it expanded by almost 64 percent), whereas the manufacturing sector, 
relatively speaking, shrank.  
Foreign aid (ODA), however, is largely statistically insignificant. It is 
negatively associated with REER and positively associated with TNT. Howev-
er, in our case foreign aid has no statistically significant impact on real effective 
exchange rate appreciation and relative growth of non-traded sector.     
Terms of trade in both the spending effect and resource allocation re-
gressions is statistically significant and negatively associated with the real ex-
change rate and the traded to non-traded goods ratio under the fixed effect 
model. It indicates that the terms of trade exerts pressure on resources to relo-
cate from the tradable to the non-tradable sectors. However, improvement in 
the terms of trade may cause a trade surplus leading to nominal exchange rate 
appreciation. To arrest the loss in international competitiveness due to nominal 
exchange rate appreciation, South Asian countries devalue their own currencies 
occasionally. This nominal exchange rate devaluation might be one of the rea-
sons for the negative association between the terms of trade and REER. 
No statistically significant linear dependence of REER and TNT on 
foreign direct investment was detected. Trade openness appears statistically 
significant in pooled OLS estimates of REER only. Broad money supply (M2) 
is not statistically significant in the fixed effect estimates of REER and TNT. 
Time fixed effect   - Yes - Yes 
Notes: Regressions contain constants. Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are in parenthesis. D-K standard errors 
are robust to heteroskedasticity, cross sectional dependence and autocorrelation.  Asterisk ***,**,* indicates 
significance at  1 ,5 and 10% level, respectively. Primary school enrollment ratio is the instrument variable.  
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Per capita GDP has statistically significant effect on REER and TNT in the 
fixed effect and pooled OLS models, respectively. It indicates that Ballasa-
Samuelson hypothesis holds in the South Asia.  
Consequences of Dutch Disease  
Lopez, Monila and Bussolo (2008) mention three adverse impacts of 
real exchange rate appreciation caused by international transfers like remittanc-
es and foreign aid. First, a negative impact on the traded sector, reinforced by 
rising inflation and economy wide wages. The adverse impact may be magni-
fied further if labour supply falls. Reservation wages in the remittances receiv-
ing households may increase or the returning migrant may attach higher value 
to leisure.   
Secondly, any current account deficit may widen. If increased con-
sumption demand induced by transfers is not covered by the non-tradables, 
import demand will increase. Due to the increase in import demand coupled 
with the fall in exports due to the loss in international competiveness, the cur-
rent account balance will worsen.     
If the international transfers do not go back abroad through increased 
imports, a large inflow will increase the money supply, and be inflationary. Al-
so, prices of financial assets and real estate shoot up after a surge in remittanc-
es. This distorts the allocation of investment across different sectors.    
Furthermore, and most importantly, because of Dutch Disease effects, 
developing countries may experience ‘premature deindustrialization’ (Rodrik, 
2015). The term ‘premature deindustrialization’ was first coined by Dasgupta 
and Singh (cited in Rodrik, 2015). This term refers to vanishing competitive-
ness and deindustrialization, before a proper phase of manufacturing competi-
tiveness. In most advanced industrialized countries at the earlier phase of the 
modern increased growth experience, the share of manufacturing value added 
in national income and the employment share of manufacturing rises at first, 
and then begins to decline with a mature economy; eventually services domi-
nate both value added and employment shares. This points to an inverted U 
shaped relation between income per-capita and growth on the one hand and 
manufacturing value added and employment shares in the economy, a process 
driven by labour productivity increases in manufacturing. The process of the 
relative decline in manufacturing output and employment usually took several 
generations in the advanced developed countries. In contemporary developing 
countries, this process of the decline in manufacturing may be much faster 
than that experienced by the world’s older developed economies, and certain 
regions, such as sub-Saharan Africa, may miss out on the industrialization ex-
perience altogether; see the evidence cited in Rodrik (2015). Globalisation fac-
tors leading to a fall in manufactures prices, coupled with a remittance induced 
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prevention of productivity increases in manufacturing may hasten the process 
of premature deindustrialization.    
Besides the loss of the dynamic gains in growth from a prolonged ex-
perience of manufacturing competitiveness, there are major adverse political 
consequences of premature deindustrialization. Historically, industrialization in 
the western societies shaped modern society; played a great role in establishing 
modern welfare states, promoting more egalitarian societies and the emergence 
of democratic institutions. Premature deindustrialization may therefore retard 
democratic development, the provision of social protection and public goods, 
as well as perpetuate inequality in the developing countries of today.  
Deindustrialization: South Asian Context 
Our discussion here is mainly confined to India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
Nepal and Sri Lanka for which data is more readily available. In South Asia 
over the period, services have been expanding, while the manufacturing sector 
has been shrinking in relative terms, as illustrated in Figure 5. In Nepal, manu-
facturing value added was almost 4 percent of GDP in the 1970s, reaching a 
peak of 9 percent in 1990s, and then started to fall in 2000s. In 2013, it was 
only 6.5 percent of GDP. Service sector value added grew to 49 percent of 
GDP in 2013. Value added in the manufacturing and service sectors followed 
the same pattern in Pakistan as well. Mughal (2013) analyzes how remittances 
can foster a remittance dependency mindset in the context of Pakistan; this 
could also be applicable to Bangladesh.  
 
 
(Continued on next page) 
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Manufacturing value added fluctuates between 14 to 15 percent of 
GDP over the period, whereas service sector value added reached 53.8 percent 
in 2013. Manufacturing value added in Sri Lanka was little higher than that of 
Pakistan (about 17 percent) but it also tends to fall after reaching a high of 
about 19 percent. In Bangladesh, manufacturing value added grew slowly from 
about 5 percent in 1970s to about 17 percent in 2010s. Manufacturing value 
added in India rose by 4 percentage points from 1972 to 2013, while the ser-
vice sector value added increased by 13 percentage points during the period. 
Figure 5: Manufacturing and services value added (% of GDP) in South 
Asian countries 
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Figure 6 illustrates employment in industry and service sectors for the 
period of 1972 to 2013 in South Asian countries. Over the period, there is an 
upward trend in employment in service sector and a downward trend in em-
ployment in industry. In Pakistan, employment in industry and service sector 
was 20.3 and 26.8 percent of total employment, respectively in 1980. Employ-
ment in industry fluctuated between 20-21 percent from the period of 1972 to 
2013, while employment in service sector, with some ups and downs, increased 
over the period. Sri Lanka shows an upward trend for service sector employ-
ment and downward trend in industry employment. Bangladesh also shows a 
divergence between employment in industry and service sector. However, In-
dia shows convergence. But actual employment in manufacturing sector is 
lower as industry includes manufacturing along with mining, construction, and 
public utilities. 
 
Amirapu and Subramanian (2015) term deindustrialization in India as ‘prema-
ture non-industrialization’ because India never experienced sufficient industri-
alization in the first place. The same applies to all other South Asian countries 
where service sector became large (almost 50% of GDP) and manufacturing 
sector starts to fall before reaching its peak. Also, there may be missing aspects 
of the structural changes in the production process, as expounded by Storm 
(2015). The structural change comes through stages -- firstly absorbing existing 
technology, then catching up with technologically advanced countries, and fi-
nally continuing manufacturing activities with accumulated knowledge; see 
Figure 6: Employment in industry and service sector in South Asian 
countries 
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Storm (2015). Migrant’s remittances to South Asia might have been one of the 
stumbling blocks in the way of this type of structural transformation.  
Utilization of Remittances   
The lion’s share of foreign remittances to South Asia is spent on con-
sumption, whereas a meager share is spent on investment purposes. So far two 
household remittance surveys have been conducted in Bangladesh -- by the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) in 2009, and by the Bangla-
desh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) in 2013. The IOM (2010) findings reveal that in 
most cases (80 percent) migrants send remittances primarily to meet family ex-
penses and the second major purpose is paying off debt and celebration of re-
ligious festivals. In only a small number of cases (5 percent) remittances are 
spent on buying land/property. BBS (2014) findings reveal that at the national 
level about 84 percent of remittances received are spent, and the remainder 
saved. According to the Reserve Bank of India, more than half of the remit-
tances to India are spent on family consumption, while the rest are either de-
posited in bank accounts (20 percent) or invested in land, property, and securi-
ties (7 percent, Afram 2012). According to the Nepal Living Standards Survey 
(2011), the major share (79 percent) of total remittances received by house-
holds are spent on daily household needs, while the rest are spent on loan re-
payments (7 percent), buying property (5 percent), education(4 percent) and 
capital formation (2 percent). Pakistan also follows a similar pattern in using 
remittances. The IOM (2009) survey in Pakistan shows that half (50.21 per-
cent) of remittances are used in consumption, and other half are used on buy-
ing real estate and agricultural machinery (22.12 percent), health(3.56), educa-
tion (4.52), loan repayment (5.52) and savings (14.08). With this pattern of 
utilization, it can be concluded that remittances to South Asia fuel inflation and 
augment demand for non-tradables leading to real exchange rate appreciation 
and a reallocation of output towards services.  
 
5. Conclusion  
 
Based on the Salter-Swan-Corden-Neary framework this study has ex-
amined the Dutch Disease impact of migrant’s remittances and foreign aid. We 
have used pooled OLS and fixed effect models with panel data for eight South 
Asian countries for the period from 1975 to 2013. We have employed two sep-
arate regressions to examine the spending effect as well as the resource reallo-
cation effect. The spending effect impacts on the real effective exchange rate, 
whereas the resource reallocation effect is measured by the traded to non-
traded output ratio. 
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We have found Dutch Disease effects of migrant’s remittances; a re-
mittances elasticity of about 0.191 is found, suggesting that a doubling of per 
capita remittances raises real effective exchange rate by about 19 percent. On 
the other hand, a one percentage point increase in remittances to GDP leads to 
fall in traded to non-traded ratio by 0.016. The magnitudes of both effects are 
substantial and economically significant. These findings imply a loss of interna-
tional competitiveness, along with a decline in the traded manufacturing sec-
tors in South Asian countries.   
Foreign aid flows are largely statistically insignificant in both spending 
effect and resource movement effect regressions, suggesting that aid is not an 
important determinant of the real effective exchange rate, and has little impact 
on the composition of output. Moreover, in the case of tied aid, a substantial 
portion of aid goes back to the donor countries. This might be the reason for 
the statistical insignificance of aid flows in this study.        
Over the period under consideration, the relative size of the service 
sector has been expanding, while the manufacturing sector has been contract-
ing in South Asian countries, pointing to premature deindustrialization 
(Amirapu and Subramanian 2015). Flying geese patterns of industrialization, 
seen in East Asia, where relatively less industrialized countries follow a regional 
industrialized economy are therefore precluded. To widen the path of industry-
led growth in South Asia there should be structural transformation towards 
manufacturing sector and then service sector, but remittances can slow down 
this transformation or make it happen partially or miss it all together.  
Although remittances may have a strong positive impact on poverty al-
leviation in this region by increasing household consumption, policy makers 
should also pay attention to its negative impact. Agriculture in South Asia still 
accounts for about 47 percent of total employment in 2013.  Industrialization 
is necessary in this region to bring about structural transformation (Storm, 
2015) and absorb surplus labour. ‘Services-led’ growth is either technologically 
less advanced, or when advanced, as in the IT sector, is too skill intensive to 
absorb surplus labour. Other services are typically non-traded, whose growth is 
constrained by domestic demand. Ultimately, manufacturing growth paves the 
way for service sector expansion. Therefore, without industrialization countries 
in this region may be mired in a quagmire of low level equilibrium trap. 
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Data Appendix  
   Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER): This is an index which considers 
nominal exchange rate, consumer price indexes of domestic country and its 
trading partners. We have employed Darvas’ (2012) dataset because the dataset 
contains REER for a longer time period.  
REERt = 
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡
(𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓)  
Where, NEERt = ∏ 𝑆𝑆(𝑖𝑖)𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤𝑓𝑓𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1  is nominal effective exchange rate, geometrical-
ly weighted average of bilateral nominal exchange rate [𝑆𝑆(𝑖𝑖)𝑡𝑡 ] between the 
domestic country and its trading partner i. And the bilateral nominal exchange 
rate is measured as the foreign currency price of one unit of domestic currency.  
   𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡
(𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓)=∏ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑖𝑖)𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤𝑓𝑓𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 , geometrical weighted average of consumer 
price index of the trading partners,  𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 is the weight of trading partner and N 
is the number of trading partners considered. ∑ 𝑤𝑤(𝑖𝑖)𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 =1.  
   Here 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 is used as proxy for price of non-tradables, while 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡
(𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓) is 
used a proxy for price of tradables. Therefore, an increase in the index refers to 
appreciation, whereas a decrease refers to depreciation.  
   Traded to non-traded sector ratio (TNT): Following Lartey et al. (2012). 
We have taken sum of value added in the agriculture and manufacturing sector 
(as a share of GDP) as the proxy for the traded sector and value added in the 
service sector (as share of GDP) as the proxy for non-traded sector output. 
Data from World Bank 2015. 
   Remittances (% of GDP): Remittances are defined as the sum of workers’ 
remittances, compensation of employees, and migrants’ transfers. Annual re-
mittances data as of April 2015 (World Bank 2015) is used here. GDP data is 
taken from World Development Indicators, 2015 to express remittances as 
percent of GDP. 
   Per capita remittances (US $): Population data is taken from World De-
velopment Indicators, 2015.   
   Foreign Aid (ODA+ Aid): Official Development Assistance (ODA) con-
sists of concessional loans and grants provided by the members of Develop-
ment Assistance Committee (DAC), by multinational institutions and, by non-
DAC countries. While, official aid refers to the aid flows from official donors 
to DAC listed countries or territories. It is also measured in two scales -- per-
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cent of GDP and per capita. Foreign aid per capita is in current US dollar 
(World Bank 2014).   
   Foreign Direct Investment (FDI): Net foreign direct investment. FDI is 
the direct investment flows to domestic economy from foreign investors. FDI 
as percent of GDP is taken from World Development Indicators 2014.  
   Net Barter Terms of Trade (TOT): Index of relative prices of a country’s 
export to imports. Rise in prices of export or fall in prices of imports indicates 
improvement in terms of trade. The index is calculated as the percentage ratio 
of the export unit value indexes to the import unit value indexes (Base year 
2000=100)(World Bank 2014). 
   General government final consumption expenditure (GOVEX): Sum 
total of government current expenditures for purchases of goods and services. 
This also includes compensation of employees. This is measured in percent of 
GDP (World Bank 2014). 
   Per capita GDP (GDPPC): Per capita GDP is expressed in current US dol-
lars (World Bank 2014). 
   Money and quasi money, M2, (percent of GDP): Sum total of currency 
outside banks, demand deposits other than those of the central government, 
savings, foreign currency deposits of resident sectors other than the central 
government, and time deposit (World Bank 2014).  
  Crop production index (2004-2006 = 100): It is the index of agricultural 
production of each year relative to the base year 2004-2006(World Bank 2015) 
  Primary school enrollment ratio: Percent of the population of official pri-
mary education age are enrolled in primary school (World Bank 2015). 
 
